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CHAPTER 18

Reproducing the substance of that language, s 223(1) of the NTA
defines native title for common law purposes as follows:

Mabo Misinterpreted: The unfortunate legacy of
legislative distortion of Justice Brennan's judgment
Kent McNeil

The High Court's bold decision in Mabo v Queensland [No 2]
undoubtedly changed the legal landscape in Australia in very positive
ways.1 For the first time, Australian common law acknowledged
that the Indigenous peoples have land rights based on occupation
of land in accordance with their traditional laws and customs. The
Court denounced the racial discrimination inherent in past denial
of these rights and outlined legal doctrines that could be used to
resolve Indigenous land claims in present-day Australia. This led to
the enactment of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (NTA), by which the
Commonwealth Parliament created a complex statutory regime for
acknowledging and giving effect to native title. In doing so, however, I
think 1 arliament seriously misinterpretedJustice Brennan's judgment
in Mabo, thereby limiting the scope of native title, facilitating its loss,
and practically eliminating the potential for inherent Indigenous
governmental authority over native title lands. While many aspects of
the decision could be discussed, in this chapter I want to focus on this
misreading of Mabo and the serious consequences that have resulted.
1 he misinterpretation arises from a passage in Brennan J's
judgment that I think was taken out of context and imported into the
definition of native title in the NTA. In Mabo, Brennan J stated:
Native title has its origin in and is given its content by the
traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs
observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a territory. The
nature and incidents of native title must be ascertained as a
matter of fact by reference to those laws and customs.2
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(1) The expression native title or native title rights and interests
means the communal, group or individual rights and interests
of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to
land or waters, where:
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional
laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed,
by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those
laws and customs, have a connection with the land or
waters; and
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law
of Australia.
In subsequent decisions such as Commonwealth v Yarmirr;3 Western
Australia v Ward,1 and Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community
v Victoria,' the High Court has interpreted and applied s 223(1) so
as to require native title claimants to prove that they had traditional
laws and customs in relation to land at the time of Crown acquisition
of sovereignty and that they have maintained a connection with the
land under those laws and customs up to the time of the claim. If they
are successful in doing so, the nature and incidents of their native
title rights and interests are determined by those laws and customs, as
Brennan J said they must be in the passage quoted above. This means,
for example, that claimants who did not have laws and customs
governing access to and use of certain resources, such as minerals,
are not entitled to native title rights in relation to those resources.6
As a result, the content of native title in Australia is generally much
more limited than Aboriginal title in other common law jurisdictions,
such as Canada where it amounts to 'the right to exclusive use and
occupation of the land held pursuant to that title for a variety of
purposes, which need not be aspects of those aboriginal practices,
customs and traditions which are integral to distinctive aboriginal
cultures', provided that the uses are not 'irreconcilable with the nature
of the group's attachment to that land'.7 Moreover, since native title
depends on the maintenance of traditional laws and customs, loss of
those laws and customs results in loss of native title.8
The problem with s 223(1), as interpreted and applied by the High
Court, is that it fails to take other more nuanced parts of Brennan J's
227

The Limits of Change: Mabo and Native Title 20 Years On

judgment into account and ignores the order made by the Court in
Mabo:' Looking first at the order, the Court declared that, with the
exception of the Islands of Dauer and Waier and certain appropriated
lands, 'the Meriam people are entitled as against the whole world to
possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands of the Murray
Islands'.10 As Brennan J pointed out, this was a declaration of 'the
native communal title of the Meriam people'.11 However, Brennan
J also observed that Justice Moynihan, who had made the factual
findings on which the High Court's decision was based, had 'found
that there was apparently no concept of public or general community
ownership among the people of Murray Island, all the land of Murray
Island being regarded as belonging to individuals or groups"2. But if
all the land belonged to individuals or groups, on what facts did the
High Court base its order declaring the communal title of the Meriam
people as a whole? Despite Brennan J's statement that the content
of native title is based on traditional laws and customs, by his own
admission Meriam laws and customs did not contain a concept of
communal title. Consequently, the communal title declared by the
Court could not have been 'ascertained as a matter of fact by reference
to those laws and customs'.13 It must have arisen from some other
source.
Although Brennan J did not provide a clear exposition of the source
of the communal title of the Meriam people, I think the following
passage reveals his understanding of this matter and explains the
order of the Court:
If it be necessary to categorize an interest in land as proprietary
in order that it survive a change in sovereignty, the interest
possessed by a community that is in exclusive possession of
land falls into that category. Whether or not land is owned
by individual members of a community, a community which
asserts and asserts effectively that none but its members has
any right to occupy or use the land has an interest in the land
that must be proprietary in nature: there is no other proprietor.14

In other words, a community such as the Meriam people that is in
exclusive possession of land and effectively asserts that its members
have the sole right to occupy and use the land has a communal
title that is proprietary in nature. Brennan J then went on to clarify
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the relationship between the communal title of the people and the
individual rights of members:
Where

a

proprietary

title

capable

of

recognition

by

the common law is found to have been possessed by
a community in occupation of a territory, there is no
reason why that title should not be recognized as a burden on
the Crown's radical title when the Crown acquires sovereignty
over that territory. The fact that individual members of the
community ... enjoy only usufructuary rights that are not
proprietary in nature is no impediment to the recognition of a
proprietary community title. Indeed, it is not possible to admit
traditional usufructuary rights without admitting a traditional
proprietary community title ... [Tjhere is no impediment to the
recognition of individual non-proprietary rights that are derived
from the community's laws and customs and are dependent on
the community title. A fortiori, there can be no impediment to
the recognition of individual proprietary rights.15

It is therefore apparent that Indigenous land rights can be layered,
as Moynihan J and the High Court found the Meriam people's rights
to be. A community in possession of a territory necessarily has a
communal title, regardless of whether their traditional laws and
customs contain such a concept — this was the title that was declared
to exist in the Court order in Mabo.16 Moreover, this title amounts to
a right 'as against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and
enjoyment of the lands'17 because, as Brennan J stated, the 'ownership
of land within a territory in the exclusive occupation of a people must
be vested in that people: land is susceptible of ownership, and there are
no other owners'.18 In the passage quoted above, Brennan J also made
clear that the fact that the traditional laws and customs may provide
only for lesser proprietary or usufructuary rights does not negate the
all-inclusive title of the community. So when he stated later in his
judgment that '[njative title has its origin in and is given its content
by the traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs
observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a territory,' he cannot
have meant to include the communal title derived from a people s
exclusive occupation of its territory. Instead, he must have had in
mind the individual and group rights referred to by Moynihan J that
were based on traditional laws and customs. Thus, in the case ol the
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Murray Islands, there are at least two layers of Indigenous land rights:
the individual and group rights of members that are determined by
reference to Meriam laws and customs, and the community's allinclusive rights against the whole world that arise, not from Meriam
laws and customs, but from exclusive occupation of the islands by the
entire community.
Unfortunately, the drafters of s 223(1) of the NTA seem to have
disregarded the Court order in Mabo entirely and taken no account
of the passages in Brennan J's judgment that refer to the proprietary
title of Indigenous communities that is derived from their exclusive
occupation of land. As a result, in interpreting and applying the NTA
in cases such as Ward,'20 the High Court has limited native title to
rights that existed under traditional laws and customs at the time of
Crown acquisition of sovereignty. Although one of the express objects
of the NTA in s 3(a) is 'to provide for the recognition and protection
of native title,' the title that is recognised and protected is the title as
defined in s 223(1), not the kind of communal title that was declared
by the High Court to exist on the Murray Islands.
I he restrictive definition of native title in s 223(1) gives rise to
this question: Did the enactment of the NTA foreclose the possibility
of future declarations of all-inclusive communal title based on
exclusive occupation, as declared in the Court order in Mabo2. I
think the answer is clearly no, for several reasons. First, as held in
Mabo, the communal title of Indigenous peoples is proprietary, and
as a general rule legislative abrogation of property rights has to be
clear and plain to be effective.21 The same rule applies to Indigenous
land rights.-2 Principles of statutory interpretation also discourage
giving substantive effect to a definition section (which s 223 clearly
is), and favour constructions of legislation that maintain the
jurisdiction of the courts.24 Moreover, s 51(xxxi) of the Australian
Constitution provides that the Commonwealth Parliament can make
laws for the acquisition of property on just terms', thereby imposing
a constitutional requirement of compensation. If the NTA did away
with Indigenous communal title based on exclusive occupation as
declared in the Court order in Mabo, just compensation would have to
be paid to any Indigenous communities that lost their communal title
as a result. Finally, in Wik Peoples v Commonwealth^25 Justice Drummond
held that a claim to Aboriginal and possessory title' filed before the
enactment of the NTA could go ahead without being converted into
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a native title claim under the NTA, especially if aspects of the claim
were outside the Act's scope, and the case proceeded all the way to the
High Court on that basis.26 In other words, enactment of the statute
and inclusion of a definition of native title therein did not do away
with possessory land rights outside the NTA. Although claims brought
under the NTA are limited to native title claims that come within the
definition in s 223(1), claims brought outside the Act are not.
As mentioned above, native title claims brought under the NTA
have been limited by the High Court's interpretation of s 223(1)
to rights and interests that can be proven to have existed under
traditional laws and customs at the time of Crown acquisition of
sovereignty. In addition, the Court held in Yorta Yorta that Indigenous
communities lost the authority to make new laws and customs at that
time, effectively denying them any right of internal self-government.
Referring to native title rights and interests in that case, Chief Justice
Gleeson and Justices Gummow and Hayne stated:
It is important to recognise that the rights and interests
concerned originate in a normative system, and to recognise
some consequences that follow from the Crown s assertion
of sovereignty. Upon the Crown acquiring sovereignty, the
normative or law-making system which then existed could not
thereafter validly create new rights, duties or interests. Rights
or interests in land created after sovereignty and which owed
their origin and continued existence only to a normative system
other than that of the new sovereign power, would not and will
not be given effect by the legal order of the new sovereign.
While this denial of authority to make new laws and customs seems to
stem principally from the outdated English doctrine that all political
authority comes from the Crown, in my opinion the denial also relates
to reliance on traditional laws and customs to define native title. Given
that the content of that title depends on the laws and customs in
existence at the time of Crown acquisition of sovereignty, changes to
those laws and customs could change the content of the title, not just
within the Indigenous community, but vis-a-vis the rest of Australian
society. For example, if their traditional laws and customs at the time
of Crown sovereignty did not give them a right to the minerals on
their native title lands, changes to those laws and customs that would
give them that right could have an impact on the rights of the Crown
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and other Australians. The High Court does not seem to be willing to
envisage this kind of possibility.
If, however, Indigenous peoples have the kind of proprietary
communal title that Brennan J described and the High Court declared
in relation to the Murray Islands, this problem does not arise. In that
situation, the community's rights vis-a-vis the rest of the world, as
declared in the Court order in Mabo, are all-inclusive because they
arise from exclusive occupation. Traditional laws and customs do not
define the content of that title externally, instead, they apply internally to
govern the rights of the members among themselves.28 Consequently,
changes to those laws and customs would not have an impact on the
rights of other Australians. Brennan J envisaged just this kind of
scenario in Mabo:
Of course in time the laws and customs of any people will
change and the rights and interests of the members of the
people among themselves will change too. But so long as the
people remain as an identifiable community, the members
of whom are identified by one another as members of that
community living under its laws and customs, the communal
native title survives to be enjoyed by the members according to
the rights and interests to which they are respectively entitled
under the traditionally based laws and customs, as currently
acknowledged and observed.29

In Yorta Yorta, the High Court did acknowledge that some modifications
to traditional laws and customs are permissible. However, Gleeson
CJ and Gummow and Hayne JJ clearly limited the authority of
Indigenous communities in this regard:
[Wjhat the assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown
necessarily entailed was that there could thereafter be no
parallel law-making system in the territory over which it
asserted sovereignty. To hold otherwise would be to deny the
acquisition of sovereignty and as has been pointed out earlier,
that is not permissible. Because there could be no parallel law
making system after the assertion of sovereignty it also follows
that the only rights or interests in relation to land or waters,
originating otherwise than in the new sovereign order, which
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will be recognised after the assertion of that new sovereignty are
those that find their origin in pre-sovereignty law and custom.30

But to maintain that Indigenous communities retained law-making
authority within their communities (as Brennan J appears to have
envisaged in the passage quoted above) is not to deny the sovereignty
of the Crown. In the Canadian case of Campbell v British Columbia,"
for example, Justice Williamson held that the Nisga'a Nation retained
a right of self-government over their Aboriginal title land that is
not inconsistent with the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty.3'2 The
monolithic conception of sovereignty clung to by the High Court in
Yorta Yorta also fails to acknowledge the reality that communal rights
necessarily entail community decision-making authority, the exercise
of which depends on Indigenous governance systems.33
In summary, I think the Commonwealth Parliament seriously
misinterpreted Justice Brennan's judgment in Mabo when it enacted
the NTA. The negative consequences for Indigenous peoples in
Australia are apparent in the limited content of native title, loss of
title when traditional laws and customs are not maintained, and
judicial denial of a right of self-government. Of course one solution
to this problem would be to amend the NTA so that the definition of
native title contained therein correctly reflects Brennan J's judgment.
Another possible solution would be for Indigenous communities to
commence legal actions outside the NTA and seek declarations of the
kind of title found in the Court order in Mabo. The goal would be to
restore the formulation of Indigenous land rights contained in Mabo
and distorted by the definition of native title in the NTA. Twenty
years after the Mabo decision, this correction is long overdue.
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